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Trade-offs Between Severance Tax Revenues 
and Coal Mining Employment 
Jill L. Findeis and James S. Shortle 
A severance tax can provide local jurisdictions with additional revenues to finance economic 
development, yet the imposition of a tax may create coal industry employment losses. This research 
analyzes this issue by examining the demand for Pennsylvania steam coal, providing estimates of the 
unconditional own-price elasticities of demand for coal in each of two demand regions. These 
estimates in conjunction with labor/output coefficient estimates are used to determine the extent to 
which coal employment in a region already witnessing slow mining industry growth will be negatively 
affected. 
A majority of those states possessing significant 
coal reserves have imposed coal severance 
taxes, either ad valorem or specific. 
Pennsylvania, although historically a major coal 
producing state, has not legislated a severance 
tax on coal, but proposals to adopt a severance 
tax as a means of generating additional state and 
local revenues have been made. A severance 
tax on Pennsylvania coal would clearly provide 
additional funds to the Commonwealth and 
could be structured to provide revenues for 
local economies, revenues that proponents 
argue are badly needed during this era of 
Federal fiscal restraint. But it is equally apparent 
that a severance tax would have negative 
impacts as well. Of particular concern is the 
potential negative impact that such a tax would 
have on coal industry employment. Given the 
high unemployment rates recently witnessed in 
rural Pennsylvania, a severance tax on coal 
could further exacerbate this problem in rural 
areas dependent on coal mining activity. 
Perspective 
In 1982, approximately 75 percent of the coal 
consumed in the New England and Middle 
Atlantic Census Regions was purchased by 
electric utilities, with Pennsylvania being the 
dominant supplier.
1 Although a portion of 
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1 Estimate derived from U.S. Department of Energy. Coal Dis-
tribution, January-December, 1982. Washington, D.C. March, 1983. 
Pennsylvania's coal supply is used to produce 
coke, utilized by residential and commercial 
consumers directly, and purchased for other 
industrial uses, these purchases are small 
compared to those made by electric utilities. 
Since electricity generation is the predominant 
use of Pennsylvania coal, steam coal used to 
generate electricity is the focus of this study. 
Depending on the structure of the market for 
Pennsylvania coal, a severence tax may 
negatively affect consumers, producers, or both. 
Fuel adjustment clauses legislated during the 
1970s allowing electric utilities to pass on fuel 
cost increases directly to electricity consumers 
mean that a tax on coal affecting the utilities 
will have a direct impact on consumers of 
electricity in the Northeast. Coal producers 
may also be affected, with production of coal in 
the aggregate being curtailed by the higher 
production costs associated with the imposition 
of a severance tax. Given a tax, marginal mines 
currently earning low rates of return may no 
longer find it profitable to operate. If the 
aggregate quantity of coal mined is reduced as 
a result, it is reasonable to expect that mining 
employment will decrease in the long run. The 
burden of a severance tax on coal will most 
likely be shared between consumers in the form 
of higher utility rates, producers in the form of 
lower profits, and coal miners in terms of job 
losses. 
The spatial distribution of Pennsylvania's 
coal supply between Pennsylvania and those 
states importing Pennsylvania coal will also af-
fect the distribution of a tax. At present, ap-
proximately thirty percent of Pennsylvania's 
steam coal supply is exported to other states in 
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Melmed using Hogarty's LOFI/LIFO
2 test to 
include New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Delaware, 
and Maryland. While tax revenues will accrue 
to Pennsylvania and the burden of a tax will 
affect coal producers, miners and mining 
communities in Pennsylvania alone, affected 
consumers may be geographically diverse. If 
coal or products utilizing coal as an input are 
exported from Pennsylvania to other states, 
consumers in these states may confront higher 
prices. The extent to which the tax can be 
exported to other states will depend on the 
own-price elasticity of demand for Pennsyl-
vania coal in the importing region and on the 
proportion of Pennsylvania's supply that is 
exported. 
This research explores the demand for 
Pennsylvania steam coal both from within 
Pennsylvania and by those states importing 
Pennsylvania coal. Since the impacts of a coal 
severance tax depend on the characteristics of 
steam coal demand, conditional demand func-
tions are estimated for each of the two demand 
regions. Estimates of the conditional own-
price elasticities of demand are made and are 
converted to unconditional own-price demand 
elasticities by considering the feedback effects 
of changes in the quantity of electricity de-
manded on coal consumption, given that the 
initial impetus was a tax-induced increase in 
the price of coal. The unconditional elasticity 
can be used with reasonable assumptions about 
the elasticity of coal supply to analyze the 
impacts of alternative tax rates on steam coal 
production. Once production change estimates 
have been determined, the change in steam 
coal output due to a severance tax can be 
translated into changes in labor utilization by 
coal type (bituminous or anthracite) and by 
mining method (underground or surface). 
Empirical Analysis 
Several studies have estimated the demand for 
steam coal (Labys, Paik and Liebenthal; 
Melmed; Atkinson and Halvorsen). The quantity 
of coal demanded can be modeled as a function 
of the price of coal, the prices of substitute 
fuels, and the quantity of electricity generated, 
since the demand for steam coal is 
2 Hogarty's (1975) test requires that two criteria, LIFO (little in 
from outside) and LOFI (little out from inside), be simultaneously 
satisifed for market identification. 
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a derived demand. Since observed price and 
quantity data reflect the interaction of supply 
and demand, the demand for steam coal must 
be estimated in a simultaneous equation 
framework. The approach used here is an 
adaption of the models used by Labys et al. 
and Melmed in which steam coal demand and 
steam coal price equations are simultaneously 
estimated. For this study, the quantity of coal 
demanded (Qn
c) was initially modeled as a 
function of the price of coal (Pit
c), the prices of 
fuel oil and natural gas (Pit
f and Pit"), the quantity 
of electricity generated lagged one time period 
(Qit-i
e) and the change in coal stocks (ASTKlt). 
The price equation included the following 
independent variables: quantity of coal (Qit
c), 
average rail rates (RIt) and the average 
productivity of mining labor (APLit). The fol-
lowing specifications were used to estimate 
steam coal demand (eq. 1) and steam coal 
price (eq. 2): 






(2)    
where: 
Qit
c =  quantity   of coal   consumed   in 
state i, in year t;  
P
c =  average delivered price of coal in  it
             state i, in year t (deflated);  
   Pit
f =   average delivered price of fuel         
             Oil in state i, in year t (deflated);    
   P
n =   average     delivered     price     of    it
              natural gas in state i, in year t  
             (deflated);  
 Qit -
e =   total generation of electricity in 
state i, in year t — 1; 
    ∆STKi t   =   STKit -  STKu-i, where STKit 
                    represents the stock of coal held 
                  by electric utilities in state i, in 
year t; 
            Rit =  average  rail rate  in  state  i,  in 
year t (deflated);  
 APLit =  average productivity of mining 
labor in state i, in year t;      
€it =  random error for state i, in year 
t; 
δlt  =  random error for state i, in year      
          t. 
The two-equation simultaneous equation sys-
tem was estimated using secondary data ob-
tained from sources published by the Federal 
Power Commission, U.S. Department of 
Energy, U.S. Bureau of Mines, and the coal Findeis  and Shortle 
industry. All analyses were conducted on a 
Btu basis to ensure data compatibility. 
The equations were estimated separately for 
Pennsylvania and for the remaining six states 
consuming significant quantities of Pennsyl-
vania coal. The six states included in the im-
porting region were Delaware, Maryland, New 
York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and 
New Jersey. A separate demand function for 
Pennsylvania was estimated to yield additional 
information on the spatial impacts of 
severance tax incidence. Due to the high cost 
of transporting coal, Pennsylvania produces 
large quantities of coal for consumption within 
the state at delivered prices significantly lower 
than prices paid by states importing Pennsyl-
vania coal. The close proximity of Pennsyl-
vania utilities to a relatively low-cost fuel 
source may cause the own-price elasticity of 
demand for coal by Pennsylvania (TJP
C) to differ 
from the own-price elasticity of demand 
(T?O
C) estimated for the other Northeastern states. 
In addition, a Chow test confirmed that the 
estimation of the demand for steam coal could 
be improved by estimating the demand by 
Pennsylvania separately. 
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) was used to 
estimate the Pennsylvania steam coal demand 
function. The demand function for the six-state 
region was estimated using 2SLS in conjunction 
with the Parks Method to analyze pooled 
time-series cross-section annual state data. In 
both cases, the equations were initially 
estimated using post-Embargo data. 
The six-state demand equation was readily 
estimated using the pooled 1973-1982 data, 
but the Pennsylvania function was difficult to 
estimate using post-Embargo data, since coal 
prices and coal consumption have simulta-
neously increased substantially since 1973. The 
difficulty associated with estimating 
Pennsylvania's demand function over this pe-
riod was exacerbated by the low number of 
observations, but supports Bohi's contentions 
regarding the instability of coal markets since 
the Embargo. Consequently, to estimate 
Pennsylvania's response to a coal severance 
tax, the data set used to estimate equation (4) 
below included annual data from 1960 through 
1982. The second stage demand equations for 
each demand region are shown below, with 
coefficient t-statistics being indicated in paren-
theses: 
DEMAND FUNCTION FOR SIX IMPORT-
ING STATES: 
Tradeoffs     205 
(3)    Qit
c = 37.073 - 0.423 Plt
c + 0.392 Qit-1
e 
(-1.242)         (19.640) 
PENNSYLVANIA DEMAND FUNCTION: 
(4)     Qit
c = 43.444 + 2.194 Plt
c + 2.630 Qit-i
e 
(0.539)         (18.567) 
where: 
Qit
c  =  quantity of coal consumed in state 
           i, in year t, in trillion Btu;  
Pit
c  =  average delivered price of coal in    
           state i, in year t, in cents/10
6 Btu   
           (defeated); 
Qit-i
e = total generation of electricity in 
state i, in year t — 1, in trillion 
Btu. 
Several variables, notably substitute fuel prices 
were eliminated from the original model spec-
ifications due to lack of statistical significance. 
This may reflect lack of fuel flexibility in existing 
generation units, with the demand for coal 
being relatively inelastic, at least in the short 
run, given the existing capital stock. The 
influence of changes in coal stocks held by 
utilities was also found to be statistically in-
significant. 
In contrast, the electricity generation vari-
able lagged one time period was found to be 
highly significant in both regions, with varia-
tions in electricity generation accounting for a 
large proportion of the variation in coal pur-
chases. The coefficient of the price variable 
was found to be negative for the six-state 
equation, as expected. However, the coefficient 
for the price of coal variable in the 
Pennsylvania equation was positive but had a 
very low t-statistic (0.539), indicating that the 
response of coal consumption to changes in 
coal prices approximately equals zero, at least 
in the range of prices being considered. This 
result was not surprising, given the large dif-
ferential between steam coal and fuel oil prices. 
The Pennsylvania equation estimated here 
conforms with previous observations that 
changes in steam coal prices have had little 
impact on steam coal use in Pennsylvania, but 
that changes in electricity demand have caused 
coal consumption to increase substantially in 
recent years. 
Derivation of the Conditional and 
Unconditional Elasticities of Demand 
The conditional own-price elasticity of demand 
for steam coal indicates the responsive- 206    October 1985 
ness of the quantity of coal demanded to a 
change in steam coal price. Based on equations 
(3) and (4), conditional estimates of the own-
price elasticity of demand (7?°) for Pennsylvania 
and the other Northeastern states in 
Pennsylvania's market area were derived using 
average 1980-82 coal price and quantity data. 
For the six-state importing region, TJO
C equalled 
—0.2077, while the conditional own-price 
elasticity of demand for Pennsylvania (T7P
C) 
equalled O.
3 In both cases, the conditional own-
price elasticity of demand is very inelastic. 
However, these elasticities are conditional on 
the quantity of electricity demanded which 
may change in response to changes in the price 
of steam coal, and further influence the quantity 
of coal demanded. The unconditional elasticity 
of demand (17°*) will reflect the total 
responsiveness of coal demand to changes in the 
price of coal by incorporating the feedback 
effects through the electric energy sector. The 
conditional and unconditional elasticities can 
be related by letting C(P
C, Q
e) be the conditional 
demand for steam coal as a function of the price 
of coal (P°) and the total amount of energy 
generated in the demand region (Q
e), and E(Pj
e) 
be the demand for electric power by power 
class j, where Pj
e  is the average price of 
electricity to the jth class. Prices paid by the 
three major power classes (residential, 
commercial, and industrial) are determined by 
state utility commissions according to the 
formula Pj
e = F^P
0). Using these relationships, 
the unconditional own-price elasticity of 
demand (i7
c*) can be written: 





C*   =   unconditional own-price elasticity of   
             demand for steam coal; 
Ŋ
C   =    conditional own-price elasticity of    
             demand for steam coal; 
   €j
ce    =    elasticity of steam coal demand with   
                 respect to the quantity of electric    
                power generated; 
 λj    =    proportion of total electricity pur  
             chased by power class j; 
3 Since 5Qit°/dpit
cis statistically equivalent tc zero for Pennsyl-




0) is also approximately equal to zero. 
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Ŋj
ee = own-price elasticity of demand for 
electricity by power class j; 
€j
ec  = elasticity of the administered price of 
electricity to power class j with re-
spect to the price of coal. 
Beierlein, Dunn, and McConnon provide es-
timates of the own-price elasticity of demand 
(T?j
ee)
4 for electricity for each of the three 
power classes in the Northeast region (i.e., j — 
1, 2, 3). The elasticity of steam coal demand 
with respect to electricity generation (e
ce) for 
each demand region can be derived from 
equations (3) and (4) in conjunction with average 
1980-82 coal production and electricity 
generation data. These estimates can be used 
with the conditional own-price elasticities of 
demand to find the unconditional own-price 
elasticity for each demand region, given 
specific assumptions regarding €j
ec, the elasticity 
of the administered price of electricity to sector j 
with respect to the price of coal. Given that 
most states have adopted fuel adjustment 
mechanisms that allow utilities to pass on fuel 
cost increases to electricity consumers, it is 
reasonable to assume that coal price increases 
will be passed through to electricity consumers 
in proportion to the cost of coal as a percentage 
of the total cost of electricity. Using these 
concepts, the unconditional own-price 
elasticities of steam coal demand for 
Pennsylvania and for the six-state region 
equalled —0.0061 and —0.2122, respectively. In 
both cases, the unconditional own-price 
elasticity of demand was found to be more 
elastic than the conditional elasticity of 
demand, as would be expected. These elas-
ticities are critical for assessing the impacts that 
imposition of a severance tax could have on 
mining employment. 
Analyzing the Impacts of a Severance Tax  on 
Pennsylvania Coal 
To analyze the impacts of a severance tax on 
steam coal prices and steam coal production, 
the unconditional own-price elasticity of de-
mand (Ŋ
C*)  as well as the elasticity of coal 
supply (€s
c) must be known. The distribution of 
impacts will depend on these elasticities and the 
magnitude of the tax imposed. The uncon- 
4 Beierlein, et al. estimated tj*
f  for the Northeast based on 1967-
1977 data. The elasticities were estimated using a combination of 
error components methods and seemingly unrelated regressions. Findeis and Shortle 
ditional own-price elasticity of demand for 
Pennsylvania coal in each demand region has 
been estimated here. Although the elasticity of 
supply for Pennsylvania coal is believed to be 
relatively elastic in the long run, the relation-
ships embodied in es
c are particularly difficult to 
estimate accurately without detailed technical 
information. The elasticity of supply for coal 
will not be estimated here. Rather, a different 
approach will be taken: By assuming 
alternative values for es
c, the range of em-
ployment losses and tax revenue gains created 
by a tax can be determined. 
From a development perspective it is par-
ticularly desirable to know the maximum po-
tential mining employment losses projected to 
occur as a result of tax imposition. If large 
numbers of mining employment opportunities 
are lost in rural Pennsylvania as a result, the 
wisdom of imposing a severance tax should be 
questioned. This is particularly true if the 
number of jobs lost is large compared to the 
revenue generated. The 
4tworst case" scenario 
analyzed here provides an upper limit on 
employment losses and a lower limit on tax 
revenues generated. Given the estimated un-
conditional price elasticities, the "worst case" 
scenario would occur if supply was perfectly 
elastic. Alternatively, minimum losses in mining 
employment would equal zero man-days of 
employment, corresponding to a "best case" 
scenario where coal production losses equal 
zero and tax revenue is maximized. 
Tradeoffs     207 
The impacts of alternative specific severance 
tax rates on coal prices and production are 
illustrated under a "worst case" scenario in 
Table 1. Alternative tax rates are applied to the 
average delivered price of steam coal in each 
demand region (Pennsylvania and the six 
importing states), using 1983 observed prices 
as a base. Using estimates of the percentage 
change in the price of steam coal due to a tax, 
changes in the quantity of steam coal supplied 
by Pennsylvania given a tax can be derived 
using the unconditional own-price elasticities 
of demand estimated for each region. Changes 
in steam coal output under a "worst case" 
scenario are derived separately for each region 
and then summed to yield estimates of the total 
change in steam coal output. 
Due to the inelastic nature of the demand for 
Pennsylvania steam coal, changes in coal con-
sumption due to a severance tax on steam coal 
are small, even under a "worst case" scenario. 
This is particularly true for Pennsylvania coal 
sold to Pennsylvania's electric utilities. When 
the delivered price of coal increases by $0.50 
to $2.00 per ton, coal purchased in 
Pennsylvania maintains its substantial price 
advantage over fuel oil. When the delivered 
price of coal increases, electric utilities continue 
to purchase coal in quantities comparable to 
pre-tax consumption rates, although the 
resulting higher electric rates cause some 
decrease in electricity consumption and thus 
some decrease in coal consumption. This 
Table 1.    Steam Coal Price and Quantity Change Estimates with Varying Specific Tax Rates 






Price with Tax 
($/Short Ton)
8
Change in Consumption of 
Pennsylvania Steam Coal 
(Short Tons)
b
Pennsylvania to Pennsylvania  0.00  35.59                 0 
  0.50 36.09 -     2,087
  1.00 36.59 -     5,614
  1.50 37.09 -     8,421
  2.00 37.59 -   11,228
Pennsylvania to Importing Region  0.00 45.77               0
  0.50 46.27 -   30,803
  1.00 46.77 -   61,605
  1.50 47.27 -  9 2 ,411
  2.00 47.77 -123,213
Pennsylvania to All Regions  0.00 38.31              0
  0.50 38.81 -  3 3 ,610
  1.00 39.31 -   67,219
  1.50 39.81 -100,832
  2.00 40.31 -134,441
"Based on 1983 observed prices for Pennsylvania steam coal. 
"Based on 1980-1982 average coal consumption by electric utilities from Pennsylvania's steam coal supply. 208    October  1985 
process is reflected in the quantity change es-
timates for the Pennsylvania demand region in 
Table 1. 
Similarly, changes in coal consumption in the 
six-state importing region reflect the relatively 
inelastic demand for coal in that region. 
However, the change in coal utilization due to a 
tax levied on Pennsylvania coal is greater in the 
importing region than in Pennsylvania. This 
may reflect the greater importance and use of 
alternative generation fuels in these states as 
well as the smaller relative difference between 
coal and fuel oil prices. While there is a greater 
negative output response to a tax in the 
importing region, this response is still very 
small. If the elasticity of supply (ea
c) is less 
than the supply elasticity assumed under the 
"worst case" scenario, changes in the quantity 
of Pennsylvania coal imported to this region 
will be even smaller. 
Changes in coal consumption in Table 1 can 
be translated into changes in coal industry 
employment using simple output-employment 
relationships estimated in Findeis and Shortle. 
The equations embodying these relationships 
for Appalachian coal are included in Appendix 
A. Output-employment relationships were es-
timated for the two coal ranks found in the 
Appalachian region, bituminous and anthracite, 
and for the two predominant mining methods, 
surface and underground. 
The equations in Appendix A were estimated 
using annual state data from 1960 through 1980 
for those states mining significant quantities of 
coal in Appalachia. Employment measured as 
annual man-days of employment was modelled 
as a function of coal production and other 
exogenous variables influencing coal labor 
productivity. Until the early 1970s the coal 
industry experienced substantial growth in labor 
productivity on average throughout the U.S. 
Productivity growth 
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reflected both the adoption of advanced mining 
methods in both surface and deep mining and 
the growing percentage of total output 
obtained by surface mining methods. How-
ever, in the early 1970s this trend reversed. 
The cause of this reversal is widely attributed 
to the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety 
Act of 1969. Factors influencing average pro-
ductivity over time are incorporated in the 
equations in Appendix A by inclusion of a time 
variable and a dummy variable for the Federal 
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 for 
both coal types and mining methods, while 
regional variations in factors influencing em-
ployment such as geologic conditions are in-
corporated by inclusion of state dummy vari-
ables. Other variables hypothesized to better 
capture productivity trends (e.g., a time-output 
interaction variable) were initially included but 
were rejected. 
The output-employment relationships in 
Appendix A were used in conjunction with the 
output changes in Table 1 to determine the 
employment impacts of severance taxes under a 
"worst case" scenario. Since most of the 
anthracite coal mined in Pennsylvania is sold 
within Pennsylvania and not exported, changes 
in the quantity of coal exported were assumed 
to affect only bituminous coal employment. 
Changes in the quantity of coal used in 
Pennsylvania was assumed to affect both coal 
ranks, anthracite and bituminous. 
Table 2 includes the resulting changes in 
coal mining employment by demand region as 
well as total losses in mining employment in 
Pennsylvania as a result of severance taxes on 
steam coal. In Table 2 employment losses are 
calculated for alternative specific tax rates. 
Again, reflecting the inelastic nature of the 
demand for steam coal, these losses are small, 
even under a "worst case" scenario. 
The total losses in coal mining employment 
Table 2.     Changes in Coal Mining Employment by Coal Rank and Mining Method Under 
a "Worst Case" Scenario 
                                                                                   Employment Change Attributable to Severance Tax
a 
Specific  Bituminous  Anthracite 
Tax Rate 
($/Short Ton)  Underground  Surface Underground Surface  Total
   
(annual man-days of labor) 
0.50  -1,378       765  -  3 -10  -2,156 
1.00  -2,757  -1,530 -  6 -19  -4,312
1.50  -4,135  -2,295 - 9 -29  -6,468
2.00  -5,513  -3,059 -12 -40  -8,624
* Estimated using output-employment equations in Appendix A in conjunction with output change estimates in Table 1. Findeis  and Shortle  Tradeoffs     209   
Table  3.    Changes in  Coal Mining Employ-
ment and  Severance Tax Revenues Under a 
"Worst Case" Scenario 




Attributable to Tax 






0.50  -2,156  23,022 
1.00  -4,312  46.044
1.50  -6,468  69.066
2.00  -8,624  92.087
under alternative tax rates are compared in 
Table 3 to the tax revenue generated. The 
estimates in Table 3 represent the maximum 
employment losses due to taxation compared 
to the minimum  severance tax revenues that 
could be generated given alternative tax rates. If 
the elasticity of supply is more inelastic than 
that assumed under the "worst case" scenario, 
employment losses will be less than in Table 3, 
while revenues will be more. It is likely that 
this will be the case. 
Conclusions and Implications 
The unconditional elasticities of steam coal 
demand in the Northeast will have significant 
implications for the distribution of impacts re-
sulting from the imposition of a severance tax 
on Pennsylvania coal. In this study the demand 
for steam coal was shown to be very inelastic in 
Pennsylvania and in those states in 
Pennsylvania's market area. The unconditional 
elasticities estimated in this study imply that 
consumers of Pennsylvania steam coal and 
ultimately consumers of electricity will be most 
affected by severance taxes levied on 
Pennsylvania coal, with coal miners and pro-
ducers being affected to a lesser extent. 
The estimates in Table 3 indicate that a 
severance tax will not have a major impact on 
mining employment in Pennsylvania. However, 
this result is contingent on Pennsylvania's 
ability to maintain its market advantage in the 
Northeast. Given that a severance tax on 
Pennsylvania coal can be passed along, in large 
part, to the electric utilities and to electricity 
consumers, increases in the post-tax delivered 
price of Pennsylvania coal may severely 
weaken Pennsylvania's market advantage, 
encouraging coal imports. If this is the case, the 
mining employment impacts may be greater 
than estimated here. 
Whether or not Pennsylvania's position as 
the dominant supplier of coal to the Northeast is 
threatened or diminished will depend on the 
ability of other coal-producing states to supply 
coal to the Northeast at prices competitive with 
Pennsylvania's post-tax price. At present, the 
delivered prices of coal in Pennsylvania from 
coal-producing states bordering Pennsylvania 
are on average higher than the delivered price 
of Pennsylvania coal within Pennsylvania. 
This may partially reflect the high cost of 
transporting coal. However, if Pennsylvania 
loses this advantage, unemployment in rural 
areas of Pennsylvania which have been 
witnessing high unemployment rates will be 
further exacerbated. 
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b = 3884086 + 0.08900m
b - 256687S1( - 4120526Sat - 3037636S3t 
  n     =18 R
2   = 0.977 
(15.536)       (1.952)            (-1.594)         (-15.789)        (-14.063) F     = 649.509
- 3790250S4t -  1908278S5t + 4017257S6t + 518378Dt n     = 133 
(-15.305)         (-10.707)         (13.018)             (6.213)
Bituminous: Surface
0 
Lart" = 52808.431 + 0.0426Q2rt
b +  12290t - 764072Slt -  175405S2t R
2   = 0.922
(0.623)         (15.753)            (3.112)      (-7.933)       (-1.605) F     =  181.856
- 325517S3t - 161633S« - 2l0621S5t -  120262S6t n     = 132 
(-4.365)        (-1.541)        (-2.156)         (-1.455)  
* t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
bIncludes labor employed in mechanical cleaning plants. 
Symbols: 
Lit
a   =  annual man-days of labor employed in anthracite mining by mining method i in year t;  
Lin
b  =  annual man-days of labor employed in bituminous mining by mining method i, in state r, in year t;  
Qit
a  =  anthracite production by mining i in year t; 
Qirt
b =  bituminous production of mining method i, in state r, in year t; 
   Dt =  legislative dummy variable for the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969(1 = legislation in effect; 0= legislation not 
in effect); 
t =  time trend variable  
             Srt = state dummy variables for state r in year t. 